![]() ![]() These missiles, when used against personnel, did not achieve the desired results. However, since the Hellfire missiles we fired were specifically designed to defeat armor, there were some very serious shortcomings. To counter, aircrews began engaging these targets with Hellfire missiles in an effort to avoid losing the initiative. This TTP resulted in numerous missed opportunities and allowed the enemy to live to fight another day. On several occasions, aircrews closed to within cannon or rocket range, only to see the enemy scatter and flee. Often, aircrews or unmanned aerial systems operators found themselves acquiring improvised explosive device (IED) emplacers or insurgents in the open, at long range. The increased use of the Hellfire by the CAB's aircraft revealed some issues with the missile. These factors, combined with capable and aggressive aircrews, increased the demand for Hellfires. Similarly, the fielding of the M-TADS gave the CAB's AH-64D Apache helicopters the ability to find and destroy the enemy with Hellfires at ranges well beyond those of the Longbow's cannon and rockets. The standoff and stealth provided by the RSTA platforms allowed the CAB scout and attack platforms to engage the enemy from increased ranges with Hellfires. The integration of manned and unmanned Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms and the fielding of the Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (M-TADS) provided new opportunities for the employment of the Hellfire missiles. Recent advances in technology would also play an integral part in the 25th CAB's demand for Hellfire missiles of different types and increased quantities. ![]() Fluctuations in these figures only occurred when older missiles were pulled out of the ammunition holding area. As the stockpiled missiles were consumed and replaced, the failure rate began to drop steadily, finally stabilizing at around 2%. The 25th CAB now provides "captive carry" time and MDFRs to the material developers. However, there was no empirical data readily available to substantiate these suspicions. Most of the "experts" within our community felt that these problems were occurring as a direct result of the "captive carry" time on the missiles. The Missile Data Firing Report (MDFR) is the Commander's tool to address these problems. All of these anomalies occurred immediately after launch with missiles that tested fine. Approximately 25% of the missiles malfunctioned, manifesting as near vertical dives, immediate "moon seeking" climbs, "corkscrew" spiraling, and other less than desirable flight profiles. After approximately 500 missiles fired, and hundreds of enemy killed and wounded, the results speak for themselves.Īfter 2 months in combat, it became apparent the missiles we inherited were displaying some "unusual" characteristics. This article covers some of the steps the 25th CAB has taken during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2006-2008 to improve utilization of the Hellfire missile in the COE by articulating the needs of the war fighting commander to the Army's material developers and then implementing innovative TTPs for their use on the battlefield. Commanders should embrace this weapon as a "go to" option in counter-insurgency operations. Its precision limits collateral damage, its flexibility provides the commander with weaponeering options, and most importantly its range provides greater protection to the crew, recognizing that even the most unsophisticated insurgent can bring down one of our multi-million dollar aircraft with a heavy machine gun in a bongo truck. In fact, the Hellfire missile is exactly the type of weapon Army Aviation should utilize in this type of conflict. The mere mention of its use in this fight normally resulted in subtle fears of fratricide or rumors of over kill.ĭue to advances in technology and improved tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to effectively harness these advances, this perception will change. In fact many of them would have qualified for Senior Army Aviator wings, if not Master Wings! Until this conflict, the Hellfire was considered to be a weapon completely dedicated to destroying armor. These missiles had been subjected to thousands of flight hours, intense weather conditions and extreme handling. TIKRIT, Iraq- Upon arrival at Combat Operating Base Speicher, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) inherited an aging, war weary conglomeration of hellfire missiles. Ball and Chief Warrant Officer Rusty Norris
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